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ARTICLE

Balancing Self-Defense and Mission
Accomplishment in International Intervention:
Challenges in Drafting and Implementing
Rules of Engagement
TODD C. HUNTLEY†
INTRODUCTION
The violent civil conflict in Syria continues after three years and
has entered an even more dangerous phase.1 Fighting has broken out
between opposition groups with violent extremists linked to Al
Qaeda emerging as the strongest of these organizations.2 The U.S.
government continues to struggle to find a way ahead that will
†

Commander, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, U.S. Navy. B.A., University of
Cincinnati, 1991; J.D., University of Cincinnati, 1996; M.A., Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 2006; L.L.M., Harvard Law School, 2009.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the
views of the Department of Defense or the Department of the Navy. All
information obtained for this article was gathered from unclassified sources.
1. See Anne Barnard, Syrian Government Forces Seize Town in a Deep Blow
to Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2014, at A4 (“Across Syria, insurgents are
fighting one another, the humanitarian crisis is growing unabated and the
government of President Bashar al-Assad is making gradual advances on several
fronts.”); Anne Barnard, Syria Rebels Turn Against Most Radical Group Tied to Al
Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2014, at A4 (arguing that Syrian Muslims who were
open to religious coexistence are becoming more and more radicalized as the war
extends over three years).
2. See CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL33487, ARMED CONFLICT IN SYRIA: OVERVIEW AND U.S. RESPONSE 4–5 (2014)
(noting the presence and creation of many groups including the Syrian Opposition
Coalition, the Supreme Military Command Council, the Islamic Front, the Syrian
Revolutionaries Front, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and Jabhat al
Nusra); see also Ben Hubbard, Islamist Rebels Create Dilemma on Syria Policy,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2013, at A1 (explaining conflicts between rebel groups such
as Ahrar al-Sham, Syrian National Coalition, Syrian Liberation Front, Syrian
Islamic Front, and Al Nusra Front, which is linked to Al Qaeda and is the biggest
concern for the United States).
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protect the innocent civilian victims among the Syrian population,
lead to an end of the Assad regime, and control the potential threat
posed by violent extremists.3 Efforts to assist moderate opposition
forces with non-lethal aid have failed to materially alter their strategic
position, and there is no desire, or agreed upon legal basis, to
intervene militarily.4 As chemical weapons are removed and the
Geneva II peace process stalls, the fighting rages on and civilian
casualties continue to climb.5 While the U.S. experience in Iraq and
Afghanistan seems to have suppressed any possible interest in
intervening,6 we are perhaps only one atrocity away for the calls for
intervention to be renewed.
If the United States should intervene militarily the forces
carrying out the operation will be tasked with pursuing multiple U.S.
foreign policy and national security objectives in a highly fluid and

3. BLANCHARD ET AL., supra note 2, at 1–2, 4.
4. See Josie Ensor, Syria Conflict Anniversary: Who Controls What, THE
TELEGRAPH (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middle
east/syria/10697998/Syria-conflict-anniversary-who-controls-what.html (depicting
which groups exert control over geographic areas of Syria); Anne Gearan, Obama
Administration Has Resumed Nonlethal Aid to Syrian Rebels, WASH. POST (Jan. 29,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-admini
stration-has-resumed-non-lethal-aid-to-syrian-rebels/2014/01/29/a697cc12-893311e3-916e-e01534b1e132_story.html (discussing resumption of the provision of
nonlethal aid to moderate Syrian rebel groups). See generally Michael N. Schmitt,
The Syrian Intervention: Assessing the Possible International Law Justifications,
89 INT’L LAW STUD. 744 (2013) (concluding that under the current circumstances,
the only legal justification for military operations in Syria would be humanitarian
intervention because the requirements for other accepted legal justifications—
Security Council authorization, self-defense, violation of the ban on chemical
weapons, and assistance to the Syrian rebels—have not been met).
5. BLANCHARD ET AL., supra note 2, at 1–2, 4. See Nick Cumming-Bruce,
Syria Speeds its Deliveries of Chemicals for Disposal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2014, at
A4 (detailing the status of current Syrian efforts to dispose of its chemical
weapons); Louis Charbonneau, Mediator Brahimi Says Syrian Election Now Won’t
Aid Peace Talks, REUTERS (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014
/03/13/us-syria-crisis-un-idUSBREA2C1VV20140313; Ensor, supra note 4 (noting
that casualties in Syria now number more than 140,000).
6. See Tony Blair, The Hand-Wringing Has to Stop. We Must Act; If We Do
Not Intervene to Support Freedom and Democracy in Egypt and Syria, the Middle
East Faces Catastrophe, TIMES (London), Aug. 27, 2013, at 17 (analyzing how,
despite the difficulties associated with the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
West needs to intervene in Syria).
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complex operational environment.7 Although protecting the civilian
population will be the stated primary objective, those forces might be
assigned additional objectives such as hastening the end of the Assad
regime, disrupting and destroying extremist groups with links to Al
Qaeda, and countering Iranian influence in the area.8 The use of force
in pursuit of each of these objectives carries its own policy,
operational, and legal challenges. Guidance on how force may be
used in pursuit of these objectives, as well as limitations imposed by
the law of armed conflict, will have to be addressed in the rules of
engagement issued to forces conducting the operation.
Current U.S. policy on Syria has been muddled at best.9 Despite
U.S. officials’ insistence that any solution must include the removal
of Assad from power, the Syrian regime appears to remain firmly
entrenched in power.10 The limited non-lethal support of moderate
opposition groups has left those organizations weakened vis-a-vis
extremist groups such as the Islamic Army of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
and Al Nusra Front (ANF).11 Senior U.S. military leaders have been
adamant that military options are limited and that any military
responses “would not be militarily decisive, but it would commit us

7. See CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD & JEREMY M. SHARP, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL43201, POSSIBLE U.S. INTERVENTION IN SYRIA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 10
(2013) (explaining that, under the current proposals, the President could authorize
the use of military force for a variety of reasons. Reasons could include: prevention
or deterrence of the use of chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction;
prevention of transfer of these weapons to terrorist groups or other state or nonstate actors; degradation of Syria’s capacity to use such weapons in the future;
protection of the United States and its allies; and, in the worst case scenario,
response to the use of weapons of mass destruction).
8. See BLANCHARD & SHARP, supra note 7, at 2 (noting that the Obama
Administration will not allow the Syrian government to use chemical weapons
against civilians again); see also supra text accompanying note 7.
9. See BLANCHARD ET AL., supra note 2, at 9–12 (discussing unclear objectives
in Syria).
10. See Michael R. Gordon, Kerry Offers Assurances as Syria Talks Draw
Near, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2014, at A10 (explaining that, although the United
States has not pulled back from its goal of removing Assad, as negotiations move
forward there is not mutual consent on whether Assad will be involved in the new
transitional government).
11. See Michael Weiss, The Unraveling: How Obama’s Syria Policy Fell
Apart, POLITICO MAG. (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/
2014/01/how-obamas-syria-policy-fell-apart-101704.html#.Ut59RBAo7IU
(arguing that the strategy taken by the United States did not do enough to support
the moderate opposition groups, and ultimately led to extremist groups—namely
the ISIS—gaining strength).
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decisively to the conflict.”12 Military operations that lack clear
objectives, or in which objectives are changed, present a major
challenge for commanders in drafting and implementing rules of
engagement.13 These challenges are compounded in operations where
the enemy does not distinguish himself from, and conducts attacks
from within, the civilian population.14 These challenges are not new,
and past experiences might shed some light on what measures may be
taken to ensure forces appropriately balance the use of force and are
prepared for the operationally complex environment in which they
will be operating.15
Senior civilian and military leaders who fail to recognize the
little appreciated but nonetheless important role rules of engagement
fill in a military operation do so at the risk of strategic mission
failure. Rules of engagement that are perceived as failing to control
or actually allowing the excessive use of force will lead to increased
opposition to the mission—within the host nation as well as
internationally—and will also likely contribute to further threats
against the intervening force. On the other hand, rules of engagement
that are perceived as being too restrictive and therefore responsible
for the death and injury of members of the intervening force will
likely generate or increase domestic political opposition to the
mission. While these challenges appear to be polar opposites, both
threaten U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives and are
compounded when military forces are ordered to intervene in an
internal conflict where the source of threats is unclear and where the
enemy is mixed in with the civilian population.
This article will examine the challenges in balancing the use of
force for self-defense and mission accomplishment by forces called
upon to intervene in a civil conflict and how rules of engagement are
used to address those challenges. It will begin with an overview of
rules of engagement from a U.S. perspective, describing the purpose,
12. Letter from Martin E. Dempsey, Gen., U.S. Army, to Eliot L. Engel, Rep.,
U.S. House of Representatives (Aug. 19, 2013), available at
http://democrats.foreignaffairs.house.gov/113/Letter_for_Rep_Engel_19_Aug_13.p
df.
13. THE INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.'S SCH.,
U.S. ARMY, JA 422, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, JA 422 75 (William Johnson
ed., 2013) [hereinafter OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK].
14. Id. at 134.
15. See infra Part III.
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development, and uses of rules of engagement by U.S. military
forces.16 Next, the article will examine the U.S. interventions in
Lebanon in 1982 and1983 and Somalia from 1992 to 1994 in order to
highlight some of the most common issues in drafting and
implementing rules of engagement for these types of operations.17
Those issues will then be examined in more depth and in light of the
potential intervention in Syria.18
I.

OVERVIEW OF U.S. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

The U.S. military defines rules of engagement as “directives
issued by competent military authority that delineate the
circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will
initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces
encountered.”19 Fundamentally, they are “the commanders’ tools for
regulating the use of force.”20 Rules of engagement provide guidance,
and restrictions, on the use of force based not only on the law of
armed conflict but also national policy and operational
requirements.21 U.S. military forces operate under permanent rules of
engagement that are approved by the Secretary of Defense and
promulgated by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.22 These
permanent rules, referred to as the standing rules of engagement
(SROE), are applicable to all Department of Defense (DoD) military
operations, contingencies, and routine functions outside U.S.
territory.23

16. See infra Part I.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part III.
19. DEP’T OF DEF., DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS JP 102 230 (Nov. 8, 2010, as amended through Dec. 15, 2013).
20. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 75.
21. Id. (“ROE provide a framework that encompasses national policy goals,
mission requirements, and the law.”).
22. Id. at 75–104 (detailing the SROE and Standing Rules for the Use of
Force). The rules, however, are currently under review. Id. at 75; see also Thom
Shanker, Pentagon Is Updating Conflict Rules in Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES, June
28, 2013, at A6 (noting that an updated SROE has been drafted to include
responses to cyber threats, but it has not yet been approved).
23. See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 84 (noting that the
SROE and Standing Rules for the use of Force are applicable to civil support and
routine Departmental functions within U.S. territories or U.S. territorial seas as well
as during law enforcement and security duties at all DoD installations).
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Rules of Engagement for Self-Defense

The SROE are separated into those rules which are applicable to
the use of force in self-defense and supplemental measures which are
available for commanders to tailor for mission accomplishment
during operations.24 Nothing in the SROE limits a commander’s
inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available
and to take all appropriate action in self-defense of the commander’s
unit and other U.S. forces in the vicinity in response to a hostile act or
demonstrated hostile intent.25 Force used in self-defense must be
proportional, that is, “sufficient to respond decisively.”26 A
proportional use of force in self-defense does not mean that it is
limited in kind by that used against the force, i.e., a force attacked
with small arms is not limited in using small arms to defend itself.27
A friendly force that is attacked by small arms fire coming from
within a building may call in an airstrike or use artillery fire against
the enemy in order to defend itself. Of course, commanders and
forces must still comply with the law of armed conflict and, while the
force used “may exceed that of the hostile act or hostile intent, . . . the
nature, duration, and scope of force should not exceed what is
required to respond decisively.”28
While identifying a hostile act is usually straightforward, the
same cannot be said for hostile intent.29 Just as a prosecutor must rely
on what might otherwise be innocuous, circumstantial evidence in
proving intent in a criminal case, soldiers will have to rely on all
available, relevant information to determine whether a particular act
indicates hostile intent, including available intelligence, past

24. See id. at 77 (“The SROE distinguish between the right and obligation of
self-defense, and the use of force for the accomplishment of an assigned mission.”).
25. Id. at 90–91 (“Unit commanders always retain the inherent right and
obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated
hostile intent.”).
26. Id. at 91.
27. Id. (“Such use of force may exceed the means and intensity of the hostile
act or hostile intent, but the nature, duration and scope of force used should not
exceed what is required.”).
28. Id. at 78, 89–90.
29. See id. at 91 (defining hostile act as “[a]n attack or other use of force
against the United States, U.S. forces or other designated persons or property” and
hostile intent as “[t]he threat of imminent use of force against the United States,
U.S. forces or other designated persons or property.”).
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experience, and known enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures.30
Determining hostile intent becomes very difficult where threats
emanate from within the civilian population and might easily be
mistaken for otherwise innocent behavior.31 For example, while
entering a town on patrol a military force spots an individual using a
cell phone. This person might either be calling to see if he should
bring home some milk or preparing to detonate an improvised
explosive device in the patrol’s path ahead. If the latter, his use of the
cell phone could indicate hostile intent and the soldiers would be
authorized to use force in self-defense. In making this determination
the soldiers would likely rely on past experience of the enemy
conducting attacks in this area using this tactic, intelligence
indicating that the enemy is operating in this particular area and may
carry out such an attack, and whether the individual’s appearance and
actions indicate that this activity is more likely than not a threat of an
imminent use of force.32
This inherent right and obligation of self-defense applies not
only to the unit of the individual commander but also to other U.S.
forces in the vicinity.33 The use of force to defend non-U.S. units as
well as foreign nationals, including foreign civilians, when they are
confronted with a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent is referred
to as collective self-defense and may be authorized only by the
President or Secretary of Defense.34 Collective self-defense of both
civilian populations and partner forces will likely be an integral
component during an intervention in a civil conflict and must be
carefully considered during mission planning to ensure that those
groups and individuals are clearly identified and appropriate authority
to defend them is granted.35

30. See id. at 82 (noting that soldiers are trained to distinguish between hostile
and non-hostile intent, and providing examples of how a soldier recognizes hostile
intent).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 90.
34. Id. at 91.
35. Cf. JONATHAN T. DWORKEN, CTR. FOR NAVAL ANALYSES, RULES OF
ENGAGEMENT (ROE) FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND LOW-INTENSITY
CONFLICT: LESSONS FROM RESTORE HOPE 5–6 (1993), available at
http://cna.org/sit
es/default/files/research/2793012000.pdf (explaining that ROE for humanitarian
operations must be permissive enough to ensure operation effectiveness but
restrictive enough to prevent negative incidents).
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One of the more controversial changes implemented in the 2005
update to the SROE was the declaration that unit commanders could
limit the use of force in self-defense by individuals assigned and
acting as part of a unit.36 While the SROE clearly state that “military
members may exercise individual self-defense in response to a hostile
act or demonstrated hostile intent,” it goes on to include self-defense
by individuals assigned to and acting as part of a unit as a subset of
unit self-defense, thereby giving commanders the authority to limit
individual self-defense by members of their unit.37 This change was
seen by some as an impermissible limitation of an individual’s
inherent right of self-defense.38 This restriction is also often conflated
with some of the more restrictive mission accomplishment rules of
engagement and blamed for causing additional casualties among U.S.
forces.39
B.

Rules of Engagement for Mission Accomplishment and Offensive
Operations

Mission accomplishment, or operational, rules of engagement
supplemental measures are classified and divided into two separate
types: those that require approval from the President, Secretary of
Defense, or Combatant Commander prior to use; and those that are
delegated to subordinate commanders for approval.40 The SROE “are
primarily used to define limits or grant authority for the use of force
for mission accomplishment . . . [and] the use of force for mission
accomplishment may sometimes be restricted by specific political

36. See Christopher D. Amore, Rules of Engagement: Balancing the (Inherent)
Right and Obligation of Self-Defense with the Prevention of Civilian Casualties, 1
NAT’L SEC. L.J. 39, 75 (2013) (concluding that Gen. McChrystal’s ROE minimized
the individuals’ right to self-defense under the belief that “courageous restraint”
would reduce civilian causalities when in reality it lead to more violence by the
insurgents, more civilian causalities and put U.S. soldiers in greater danger).
37. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 90.
38. See Amore, supra note 36, at 61 (noting that under the new ROE, although
the commander’s right to unit self-defense was recognized, the individual’s right to
self-defense was not).
39. Cf. F.M. Lorenz, USMC, Rules of Engagement in Somalia: Were They
Effective?, 42 NAVAL L. REV. 62, 70–71 (1995) (explaining how the restriction on
the ROE for U.S. snipers in Somalia led to soldiers, who were standing side-byside, having different ROE. The ROE of some soldiers permitted them to engage
the enemy, while the ROE of others prohibited engagement).
40. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 78.
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and military goals that are often unique to the situation.”41 The SROE
as a whole are “designed to be permissive in nature.”42 That is, unless
use of a specific weapon or tactic has been restricted, or requires
higher-level approval, commanders “may use any lawful weapon or
tactic available for mission accomplishment.”43 While subordinate
commanders may further restrict permissive supplemental rules of
engagement measures, they must notify the Secretary of Defense
when doing so.44 These supplemental measures typically address the
use of certain weapons systems or tactics.45
One of the typical supplemental measures included in the rules
of engagement for offensive military operations is the declaration of
certain forces as hostile.46 Once declared hostile, those forces may be
engaged with deadly force at any time based solely on their status and
without observing a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.47
Authority to target enemy combatants based on status alone is one of
the principle elements of the law of armed conflict and the
fundamental difference between law in peacetime and during armed
conflict.48 To ensure that U.S. forces comply with the principle of
distinction, positive identification must be obtained prior to attacking
a declared hostile force.49 Positive identification (PID) is defined as
“a reasonable certainty that the proposed target is a legitimate
military target.”50 Identifying and then distinguishing between
declared hostile forces and the civilian population is one of the main
challenges to drafting and implementing rules of engagement for
interventions in civil conflicts as well as counter-insurgencies.51

41. Id. at 93.
42. Id. at 86.
43. Id. at 93.
44. Id. at 86.
45. See id. at 76 (noting that rules of engagement can be used to restrict the use
of certain weapons systems or tactics).
46. See id. at 91 (defining a Declared Hostile Force as “[a]ny civilian,
paramilitary or military force or terrorist(s) that has been declared hostile by
appropriate U.S. authority”).
47. Id. at 77 (limiting authority to declare forces as hostile to certain leaders).
48. See id. (“Once a force is declared ‘hostile,’ U.S. units may engage it
without observing a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent.”).
49. Id. at 103–04.
50. Id. at 104.
51. Cf. Amore, supra note 36, at 62–64 (noting that the ROE, in order to
prevent civilian casualties, restricted the type of air support soldiers were receiving
because it was difficult to distinguish between the combatants and civilians).
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C. Drafting and Implementing Rules of Engagement
The drafting and submission of rules of engagement for approval
is an integral component of military planning and begins once a
Combatant Commander has been assigned a mission.52 Once the
Secretary of Defense approved rules of engagement and orders are
received, the supported Combatant Commander will add
supplemental measures, which he has the authority to approve, and
send those to his subordinate component and/or joint task force
commanders.53 The component and/or joint task force commanders
will, in turn, do the same and distribute to his subordinate
commanders.54 As mentioned previously, a subordinate commander
may further restrict an otherwise approved weapon system or tactic
by including a supplemental measure with that restriction; however,
this would require notification to the Secretary of Defense.55
Rules of engagement belong to the commander and are
fundamentally an operational responsibility.56 While Judge
Advocates are heavily involved in all aspects—drafting, requesting
approval from higher authorities, assisting with implementation,
training, and interpreting—the J3, or operations directorate of a joint
command, should be tasked with overall responsibility for the rules
of engagement.57 For Judge Advocates to play a meaningful role in
the drafting and implementation of rules of engagement, an
understanding of the law of armed conflict alone is not enough. A
Judge Advocate must also understand the assigned mission, the
commander’s intent for accomplishing this mission, and have a basic
understanding of the weapons, tactics, techniques, and procedures
that will be used, as well as the intelligence supporting the
operation.58
II.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTIONS:
LESSONS LEARNED IN LEBANON AND SOMALIA

The development of the current rules of engagement has been an
evolutionary process based on experiences gained during past
52. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 95.
53. Id. at 95–96.
54. Id. at 80.
55. Id. at 80, 95.
56. Id. at 75.
57. Id. at 76.
58. Id at 75.
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military operations. The U.S. experience in the civil conflicts in
Lebanon and Somalia serve as two prime examples of the difficulty
commanders and troops face in developing and implementing rules of
engagement during an intervention. A lack of a clear mission, failure
to revise rules of engagement when the tactical and/or operational
situation has changed, and a lack of intelligence or understanding of
the operational environment were all identified as contributing factors
to the loss of life during these operations.59 Unfortunately, lessons
learned from failure and tragedy can also be forgotten. Those
considering or planning an intervention in a civil conflict would be
well served in reviewing the U.S. experiences in Lebanon and
Somalia.
A.

The U.S. Experience in Lebanon in 1982 and 1983: Peacetime
Rules of Engagement for a Civil War

After a series of sectarian massacres in 1975, Lebanon exploded
in a violent civil war.60 As the fighting continued over the next six
years, both Syria and Israel intervened, supporting those factions that
were aligned with their national interests.61 Despite this intervention,
the fighting continued, and, in August of 1982, U.S. Marines entered
Lebanon as part of a multi-national force.62 The mission given to the
U.S. Combatant Commander for this operation was:
[t]o establish an environment which will permit the
Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out their
responsibilities in the Beirut area. When directed,
USCINCEUR will introduce U.S. forces as part of a
multinational force presence in the Beirut area to
occupy and secure positions along a designated
section of the line from south of the Beirut
International Airport to a position in the vicinity of the
Presidential Palace; be prepared to protect U.S. forces;
59. See Lorenz, supra note 39, at 74–75 (noting that one of the failures in
Somalia was that the ROE never changed despite the change in threat); see also
DEP’T. OF DEF., REPORT OF THE DOD COMMISSION ON BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT TERRORIST ACT, 134–36, (Dec. 20, 1983), available at
www.fas.org/irp/threat/beirut-1983.pdf [hereinafter DOD COMMISSION REPORT]
(noting that the failures in Lebanon included inconsistent interpretation of the
mission, a failure to provide a single and clear set of ROE, and a failure to provide
intelligence to the United States Multi-National Force Commander in a timely and
effective manner).
60. DOD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 59, at 27.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 28.
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and, on order, conduct retrograde operations as
required.63
The goal of this deployment was to separate the various
domestic factions, which included the Christian Lebanese Forces,
Druze militia, Shia groups, as well as the Israeli and Syrian forces,
and give the Lebanese Armed Forces the time and space to reassert
control.64
The orders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff further stated that U.S.
forces serving as part of the multi-national force would not be
engaged in combat and would operate under peacetime rules of
engagement which authorized force only in self-defense or the
defense of Lebanese Armed Forces operating alongside U.S. forces.65
Based upon assurances from the Government of Lebanon, U.S. forces
planned on entering a “relatively benign environment” where they
would be protected by the Lebanese Armed Forces and the various
militias had agreed to not interfere with the U.S. mission.66
Lacking a clearly defined mission, having no declared enemy,
and operating under peacetime rules of engagement, a difficult
mission only became more so as U.S. forces came under sporadic
attacks from Shia and Druze militia.67 On April 18, 1983, a suicide
car bomb attack against the U.S. Embassy in Beirut killed 17
Americans, including the CIA Station Chief.68 Following this attack,
members of the U.S. multinational force were deployed to provide
additional security for U.S. and British diplomatic facilities and
provided expanded rules of engagement that included explicit
63. Id. at 35. This mission statement was later expanded to authorize U.S.
forces to patrol neighborhoods in East Beirut and again expanded to authorize those
forces to provide additional security for U.S. and British diplomatic facilities. Id. at
37.
64. See John H. Kelly, Lebanon: 1982–1984, in U.S. AND RUSSIAN POLICY
MAKING WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF FORCE 85, 92–97, (Jeremy R. Azrael &
Emil A. Payin eds., 1996) (explaining that U.S. troops were only present in
Lebanon to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces in taking control of the area by
removing Druze and Muslim militias, in addition to Palestinian and Syrian
fighters). The mission statement was “[t]o establish an environment which will
permit the Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut
area.” DOD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 59, at 35.
65. DOD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 59, at 36.
66. Id. at 39.
67. Id. at 37–42.
68. Id. at 30.

2014] BALANCING SELF-DEFENSE AND MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT

95

language defining “attempts by personnel or vehicles to breach
barriers or roadblocks” as a hostile act.69 The forces operating at the
Beirut International Airport continued to operate under the original
rules of engagement, which included the following provisions:
- When on post, mobile or foot patrol, keep a loaded
magazine in the weapon, weapons will be on safe,
with no rounds in the chamber.
- Do not chamber a round unless instructed to do so by
a commissioned officer unless you must act in
immediate self-defense where deadly force is
authorized.
- Keep ammunition for crew-served weapons readily
available but not loaded in the weapon. Weapons will
be on safe at all times.70
As can be seen, while the rules of engagement for these forces
stated that force could be used in self-defense, limitations were
placed on the ability of forces to respond to any hostile act or
demonstration of hostile intent.71
In September 1983, as Lebanese Armed Forces came under
increasing attack, President Reagan authorized the use of naval gun
fire and air strikes in support of Lebanese Armed Forces engaged in
heavy fighting against Druze militia forces.72 The message
transmitting the approval for this use of force specifically stated
“nothing in this message shall be construed as changing the mission
or ROE for USMNF [U.S. Multinational Force]” and that the force
authorized was considered to be in self-defense.73 This use of force in
support of the Lebanese Armed Forces also brought about a marked
increase in attacks against U.S. forces.74 Thus, “[b]y the end of
September 1983, the situation in Lebanon had changed to the extent
69. Id. at 45. Only after the bombing of the Marine barracks was there a
request submitted to explicitly make this definition applicable to the ROE for U.S.
forces operating at the Beirut International Airport. In response to the request, the
Combatant Commander stated that this was already authorized under the ROE for
self-defense. Id. at 49–50.
70. Id. at 49–50. To differentiate, those providing security at the airport carried
a “white” ROE card, while those providing security at the diplomatic facilities
carried a “blue” ROE card. Id. at 49.
71. Id. at 49–50.
72. Id. at 45–46.
73. Id. at 46.
74. Id. at 42.
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that not one of the initial conditions upon which the mission
statement was premised was still valid[,] [t]he environment clearly
was hostile.”75 On October 23, 1983, 241 Marines were killed when a
suicide bomber rammed his vehicle through the gate and into the
barracks at the Beirut airport.76 In February 1984 the Marines were
withdrawn from Lebanon and the civil conflict exploded.77
In the aftermath of the October 23, 1983 attack, the Department
of Defense established a commission to investigate the circumstances
of the attack.78 The fundamental factor identified by the commission
in the success of the attack was the failure of the chain of command
to recognize the change in the operational environment and security
situation from those on which the mission had been planned.79 While
the threat to the U.S. multi-national force had grown and its role
expanded, security measures, including the rules of engagement, did
not change.80 Causing, or at least contributing to this failure, was a
lack of intelligence and differing interpretations within the chain of
command as to the mission assigned to the force.81
B.

Somalia from 1992 to 1994: Restricting the Rules of
Engagement in the Face of an Increasing Threat

Most people are familiar with the U.S. mission in Somalia as that
portrayed in the movie Black Hawk Down.82 While viewers were able
to get a very real sense of the difficult operational environment facing
U.S. forces, the movie represented only one operation in the broader
U.S. intervention in the civil conflict and humanitarian crisis that had
engulfed the country. Fighting between armed clans throughout 1991
had led to a humanitarian crisis in Somalia with millions at risk of
starvation.83

75. Id. at 40.
76. Id. at 32–33.
77. Kelly, supra note 64, at 103.
78. DOD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 59, at 19.
79. Id. at 135–36.
80. Id. at 135.
81. Id. at 136.
82. BLACK HAWK DOWN (Revolution Studios 2001).
83. Jihan A. Kahssay, Comment, Lessons Learned from Somalia: Returning to
a Humanitarian-Based Humanitarian Intervention, 19 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 113, 114–15 (2012).
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Attempts by the United Nations and relief organizations to
provide humanitarian assistance were unsuccessful due to the
violence.84 Ports, airfields, and relief ships were attacked, large
payments were demanded from any groups attempting to deliver aid,
and shipments were seized by armed bandits and groups loyal to the
clans.85 Even the small contingent of UN observers and security
personnel, deployed to observe an agreed upon ceasefire and assist in
the aid efforts, were attacked, having their weapons and vehicles
seized.86 Seeing the need for a more robust security element, the UN
Security Council authorized action under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter and created the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) Somalia.87
UNITAF was compromised of forces from several UN member states
with the largest portion of them being from the United States.88 The
United States exercised joint command and control of all UNITAF
forces while the original United National Operation in Somalia
(UNOSOM) mission maintained responsibility for all political
aspects and humanitarian assistance to Somalia.89 Once a secure
environment was established by UNITAF, command of the deployed
military forces would also be turned over to the United Nations.90
U.S. forces were initially deployed to Somalia in December 1992
for Operation Restore Hope as part of UNITAF.91 Operation Restore
Hope was given a mission that was “narrow and clearly defined: to
provide security for the delivery of relief supplies.”92 This seemingly
simple mission, however, was not so easy to implement in the chaotic
environment of Somalia.93 In addition to the armed clans, Somali
men had formed gangs in order to steal relief supplies and anything
84. Id. at 121–22.
85. U.N. Operations in Somalia I, Background http://www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1backgr2.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2014)
[hereinafter Background].
86. Id.
87. See S.C. Res. 794, ¶ 8–10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992)
(demanding an end to International Humanitarian Law violations, authorizing
establishment of unified command and control of offered forces, and authorizing
action under Chapter VII and VIII to include use of such measures as may be
necessary to ensure strict implementation of the arms embargo established by ¶ 5 of
UN Security Council Resolution 733 (1992)).
88. Background, supra note 85.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Lorenz, supra note 39, at 62–63.
92. Id. at 63.
93. DWORKEN, supra note 35, at 5–6.
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else of value, while others armed themselves to protect their families
from the clans and gangs.94 Additionally, the clans and other groups
had mounted crew served weapons in the beds of small trucks and
were using these “technical vehicles” to attack relief convoys as well
as rivals. Large groups of unarmed people, including children, would
swarm UNITAF patrols, stealing food and other items thought to be
of value from the vehicles and forces.95 Distinguishing between those
who were threats—those merely stealing things—and those who were
merely trying to protect themselves and their families, was
challenging at best.96
In order to provide guidance for the use of force in this
challenging and confusing environment, innovative language was
developed to deal with both the large numbers of armed men,
technical vehicles, and crew served weapons.97 The rules of
engagement developed by U.S. Central Command was based on its
standing peacetime rules of engagement and authorized the use of
force in self-defense in response to a hostile act or hostile intent,
stating “[h]ostile fire may be returned effectively and promptly to
stop a hostile act.”98 The rules of engagement also identified crewserved weapons as a threat to UNITAF forces and the relief effort,
whether or not the crew demonstrated hostile intent, and authorized
“all necessary force to confiscate and demilitarize crew served
weapons.”99 Armed individuals were treated differently under the
rules of engagement, which stated they may be considered a threat to
UNITAF and the relief effort, whether or not the individual
demonstrates hostile intent, and that commanders were “authorized to
use all necessary force to disarm individuals.”100
Having brought the violence under control, UNITAF
relinquished command and control of the military mission to UN

94. Id. at 6.
95. Id.
96. See id. (“[S]oldiers faced a complex security environment in which to
decide whether—and when—to use force.”).
97. See DENNIS P. MROCZKOWSKI, RESTORING HOPE: IN SOMALIA WITH THE
UNIFIED TASK FORCE, 1992-1993 26 (2005) (explaining how the ROE made special
note of vehicle mounted crew-served weapons, also known as “technicals").
98. DWORKEN, supra note 35, at 9–10.
99. Lorenz, supra note 39, at 64.
100. Id.
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Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) in May 1993.101 UNOSOM
II was also given an expanded mission pursuant to UN Security
Council Resolution 814 and included providing humanitarian
assistance, promoting national reconciliation, and completing the
disarmament process, among others.102 A relatively small number of
U.S. military forces remained under the command of UNOSOM II
while the bulk of the forces transitioned to a separate, U.S.-only
command, U.S. Forces Somalia (USFORSOM).103 Although there
had been some fear among the U.S. forces that the UN would
implement more restrictive rules of engagement, the UNOSOM II
Commander largely adopted the same rules of engagement under
which UNITAF had been operating.104
Shortly after UNOSOM II assumed command, the security
situation in Mogadishu deteriorated as the armed clans began to test
the UNOSOM II forces.105 By the end of May 1993, the UNOSOM II
Commander issued a “frag order” that declared armed militias,
technical vehicles, and crew served weapons as threats which could
be “engaged without provocation.”106 This order, in allowing the use
of force without being exposed to a hostile act or hostile intent,
essentially declared the armed militias, technical vehicles, and crew
served weapons as hostile and significantly expanded the authority of
UNOSOM II forces to use deadly force.107
In addition to transferring military command from UNITAF to
UNOSOM II, UN Security Council Resolution 814 also increased the
scope of the mission in Somalia.108 Besides providing security for
humanitarian assistance, UNOSOM II was tasked with completing
disarmament of the armed clans.109 On June 5, 1993, UN forces
raided a weapons storage area belonging to the clan led by
101. S.C. Res. 814, ¶¶ 10, 14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (Mar. 26, 1993)
[hereinafter Resolution 814].
102. Id. ¶¶ 3–4.
103. KENNETH ALLARD, SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED 51–52
(1995). The U.S. forces under UNOSOM II were largely providing logistical
support. The primary responsibility of USFORSOM was to serve as a Quick
Reaction Force for UNOSOM II. Id.
104. Lorenz, supra note 39, at 65.
105. Id. at 65–66.
106. Id. A “frag order” is a supplemental order to an operational plan that is
usually implemented on short notice. Id.
107. Id. at 66.
108. See Resolution 814, supra note 101 (requesting that the Secretary-General
provide various humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia).
109. Id. ¶ 7.
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Mohammed Farah Aidid, killing two members of his clan during the
operation.110 Attacks against UNOSOM II forces increased with a
Somali mob attacking and killing 24 Pakistani soldiers.111 In
response, the Security Council called for the arrest and trial of those
responsible for the attack and UNOSOM II increased its disarmament
efforts.112
U.S. forces assigned to USFORSOM and Task Force Ranger
were deployed in Mogadishu in support of UNOSOM II efforts to
both disarm the clans and capture Aidid and others responsible for
the attacks on the UN forces.113 These efforts included the October 3,
1993 U.S. Special Operations raid portrayed in the movie Black
Hawk Down during which eighteen U.S. military members were
killed and more than seventy were injured.114 The number of Somali
dead as a result of this operation has been estimated at anywhere
from several hundred to more than a thousand.115
Later that month, U.S. forces were reinforced with a Marine
contingent as the security situation continued to deteriorate.116 U.S.
forces were largely confined to their compounds where they were
often the target of small arms and mortar fire.117 To protect against
these threats, Marine snipers were authorized, pursuant to the
UNOSOM II rules of engagement as amended by the frag order, to
target crew served weapons regardless of whether they demonstrated
a hostile act or hostile intent.118 This was essentially a change of
interpretation of the existing rules of engagement, which treated the
crew served weapons as “declared hostile” forces and seemed to be
effective in reducing the threat posed by these weapons.119

110. Lorenz, supra note 39, at 66.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See ALLARD, supra note 103, at 51–52 (explaining that Task Force
Ranger was compromised of U.S. Special Operations Forces under a separate
command reporting directly to U.S. Central Command).
114. Id. at 17; BLACK HAWK DOWN (Revolution Studios 2001).
115. RICHARD W. STEWART, UNITED STATES ARMY IN SOMALIA, 1992-1994,
23
(2003)
available
at
http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Somalia/Somalia.htm.
116. Lorenz, supra note 39, at 67–68.
117. Id. at 68.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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In January 1994, Marine snipers engaged a Somali on a technical
vehicle and appeared to have killed him.120 A short time later,
Somalis came to a U.S. checkpoint and stated that the Marines had
killed a pregnant woman.121 Although a body was never found and an
investigation was unable to confirm whether the snipers had killed a
woman, it was widely reported that this had, in fact, happened.122
Additionally, it was reported that the Marines had been appropriately
acting within the rules of engagement at the time.123 Despite this, the
rules of engagement were changed and forces were no longer allowed
to target technical vehicles and crew served weapons absent a hostile
act or hostile intent.124 The change on the streets of Mogadishu was
immediate as crew served weapons once again became a common
sight.125
The U.S. experience in Somalia had significant consequences.
All U.S. and UN forces were withdrawn by March 1994 and the
conflict in Somalia intensified, with implications from this continuing
to this day.126 The U.S. Secretary of Defense at the time, Les Aspin,
resigned in December 1993, in part to accept responsibility for not
approving the deployment of requested tanks and armored vehicles to
Somalia, which many believed might have lowered the death toll of
the October 3 raid had they been available.127 Finally, the public
outrage over the scenes of the bodies of U.S. military members being
dragged through the streets of Mogadishu led to a scaling back of
U.S. involvement throughout the region and refusal to intervene in
the Rwandan genocide in 1994.128

120. Id. at 69.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 69–70.
124. Id. at 70.
125. Id.
126. Kahssay, supra note 83, at 124.
127. Eric Schmitt, Study Faults Powell Aides on Somalia, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
1995, at A13.
128. See PBS Frontline: Ambush in Mogadishu (PBS television broadcast Nov.
1, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows
/ambush/etc/script.html) (quoting Walter Clark, Deputy Special Envoy) (“The
ghosts of Somalia continue to haunt U.S. policy. Our lack of response in Rwanda
was a fear of getting involved in something like a Somalia all over again.”).
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AND

LESSONS

The experiences described above, as well as the recent
experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, continue to illustrate the
difficulty in drafting and implementing rules of engagement for
humanitarian intervention, stability, and counter-insurgency
operations. Those operations have common characteristics such as a
fluid operational environment with no clear enemy and a threat that is
hidden within the civilian population, thus requiring a careful and
limited use of force. Balancing that force in order to accomplish the
desired political and military objectives while also ensuring military
forces may adequately defend themselves is the core challenge in
drafting and implementing effective rules of engagement for these
operations.
A.

What is the mission? Forces must be given clear mission
objectives that are understood by all in the chain of command.

Effective rules of engagement are dependent on clearly defined
national policy and military objectives that are understood by all
within the chain of command. Rules of engagement encompass not
only the law of armed conflict but also national policy and
operational requirements.129 Thus, rules of engagement are a critical
element in ensuring that the force used supports the operational
requirements necessary to accomplish those national policy
objectives for the mission set forth by the President and Secretary of
Defense.
In traditional conflicts between the armed forces of opposing
states these policy objectives were fairly clear: bring about the
unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan,
remove Iraqi military forces from Kuwait and restore Kuwaiti
sovereignty, remove Saddam Hussein from power.130 The operational
requirements for accomplishing this policy objective would then
focus on applying overwhelming force, as constrained by the law of
armed conflict, to bring about the enemy's partial or complete

129. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 73; see also Amore,
supra note 36, at 47 (discussing the purpose of ROE).
130. See generally MAURICE MATLOFF, STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR COALITION
WARFARE, 1943–1944 18 (Ctr. of Mil. Hist. 1994) (1959) (discussing the concept
of unconditional surrender).
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submission as quickly as possible.131 The rules of engagement would
declare members of the enemy military forces, along with other
lawful military objectives, as hostile thereby making them subject to
attack at any time and any place.
Clear national policy objectives are particularly important in
ensuring compliance with the law of armed conflict principles of
military necessity and proportionality. The use of force during a
conflict is limited to those acts necessary to accomplish a legitimate
military objective.132 A use of force that does not contribute to the
defeat of the enemy has no military purpose and would be prohibited
by the principle of military necessity.133 In nontraditional conflicts
where the defeat of the enemy is measured by something other than
unconditional surrender or regime change, victory is measured by the
national policy objective.134 Having known, clear objectives is
important in ensuring that the use of force contributes to
accomplishing the overall objective and defeat of the enemy.
Proportionality balancing in military operations that do not have a
clear objective is also very difficult. Assessing whether the military
advantage gained outweighs the incidental civilian casualties caused
by the use of force depends on being able to understand how that
operation contributes to the defeat of the enemy. Thus, both the
principle of military necessity and the principle of proportionality
have a direct relationship to, and are dependent on, having clear
national policy objectives for the operation.
Rules of engagement for a mission with the objective of the
unconditional surrender of the enemy or changing the enemy regime
is very different than that for a humanitarian intervention or counterinsurgency mission. While additional limitations not required by the
law of armed conflict may be placed on the use of force based on
national policy and operational requirements, rules of engagement for
missions such as these will be permissive in nature.135 The permissive
rules of engagement for the former are justified in a utilitarian
approach to the law of armed conflict that interprets military
necessity in the broadest possible manner.136 As Walzer notes, this
131. Charles J. Dunlap Jr., International Law and Terrorism: Some “Qs And
As,” 2002-NOV ARMY LAW. 23, 28 (2002).
132. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 104.
133. Id. at 11.
134. J. Boone Bartholomees, Theory of Victory, U.S. ARMY WAR C. Q.:
PARAMETERS, Summer 2008, at 25, 28.
135. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 78.
136. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS, 129–131, 144 (2d ed. 1992).
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utilitarian interpretation of military necessity is limited only by a
prohibition on wanton violence and those specific acts prohibited by
the law of armed conflict.137 Thus, almost any act within those
limitations can be justified as bringing a quicker end to the hostilities
and is, therefore, compliant with the principle of necessity.138 Such an
approach has been favored by the United States and other states in
past armed conflicts but is not suited to the majority of modern
conflicts.
In today’s conflicts, national policy objectives are not so clear.
Take for example Operation Odyssey Dawn, the U.S. portion of the
NATO mission in Libya in 2011.139 UN Security Council Resolution
1973 established a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace and authorized
member states “to take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians
and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.”140 Neither
UNSCR 1973 nor any other UNSC resolution mentioned regime
change as an objective or authorized actions to oust Qadhafi from
power.141 However, in responding to House Resolution 292,
President Obama stated that removing Qadhafi from power was an
objective of both the United States and the international community
and that accomplishing the stated military objectives of stopping
attacks on civilians and preventing the continued military advances of
Libyan forces would “pave the way” for Qadhafi’s departure.142
While, on its face, the military objective was limited to the protection
of civilians from attacks by Libyan forces, placing that objective in
the context of the broader national policy objective of regime change
likely made rules of engagement for military operation more
permissive than they would be absent the regime change objective,
allowing a more aggressive use of force to destroy those Libyan
forces standing between the rebels and the end of the Qadhafi regime.
137. Id. at 129.
138. Id.
139. Robert M. Danin, Libyan Strikes: Clearer Objectives Needed, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 20, 2011), http://www.cfr.org/libya/libyan-strikes-clearerobjectives-needed/p24432.
140. S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
141. Id.
142. Scott Wilson, Obama Says Hill’s Approval Not Needed for Libya Action,
WASH. POST, June 15, 2011, at A01; THE WHITE HOUSE, UNITED STATES
ACTIVITIES
IN
LIBYA
(2011),
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/documents/united-states-activitieslibya.html.
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Establishing a clear national policy objective for any
intervention mission in Syria would likely prove even more
challenging. There are multiple U.S. national security and foreign
policy interests at stake in Syria today,143 thus it is unlikely that the
objective of a U.S. intervention would be limited to protection of the
civilian population. President Obama and other U.S. leaders have
already stated that the resolution of the conflict in Syria must include
Assad leaving power.144 As in Libya, even if not stated explicitly,
U.S. military action to protect the civilian population would also
undermine Assad’s military power and would likely be applied in
such a way as to hasten his downfall.
Perhaps the most vital U.S. national policy objective to be
furthered in any U.S. intervention would be to disrupt and destroy Al
Qaeda-associated forces present in Syria. Both the Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the Al Nusra Front (ANF) appear to have
links to Al Qaeda (AQ), or at least share a common ideology, and
both of these groups appear to be gaining strength.145 Additionally,
reports have surfaced that numerous European and U.S. citizens have
joined the ISIS and/or ANF.146 There are fears that these individuals
will return to their home countries, radicalized and trained, and will
carry out attacks.147 As in Afghanistan, any U.S. mission to protect

143. BLANCHARD & SHARP, supra note 7, at 12; Cf. Scott Wilson, What Are
the Pros and Cons of Intervention in Syria for Obama Administration?, WASH.
POST (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/what-are-the-prosand-cons-of-intervention-in-syria-for-obama-administration/2013/04/25/0ad5694aade9-11e2-8bf6-e70cb6ae066e_print.html.
144. President Obama and Prime Minister Erdogan of Turkey, Joint Press
Conference at the White House Rose Garden (May 16, 2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/16/joint-press-conference-pre
sident-obama-and-prime-minister-erdogan-turkey;Sec’y of State John Kerry,
Opening Remarks Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee (Sept. 4, 2013),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/09/213787.htm;
Interview by Reena Ninan with Hillary Clinton, Sec’y of State (Apr. 1, 2012),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/04/187352.htm.
145. See Anne Barnard, Syria Rebels Turn Against Most Radical Group Tied
to Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2014, at A4 (describing radical groups in Syria).
146. Michael Birnbaum, Flow of Europeans into Syria a Concern, WASH.
POST, Dec. 6, 2013, at A09; Alex Spillius, Number of Foreign Fighters in Syria
Nearly
Doubles,
THE
TELEGRAPH
(Dec.
17,
2013),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10523203/Numberof-foreign-fighters-in-Syria-nearly doubles.html.
147. Maria Abi-Habib, European Spies Reach Out to Syria, WALL ST. J., Jan.
15, 2014, at A1; Spillius, supra note 146.
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the Syrian population would be undertaken alongside direct action
counter-terrorism missions against AQ and associated forces.148
Another likely U.S. national policy objective would be
countering the role of Iran and its surrogates in Syria. It has been
reported that both Hezbollah and Iranian Qods Force operatives are
playing an increasing role in the fight and are vital to Assad
remaining in power.149 Both have been linked to attacks against the
United States, including the bombing of the Marine Barracks in
Beirut in 1983 and supporting attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq, and
continue to challenge broader U.S. interests.150 Even if countering
these forces is not explicitly included as an objective, U.S. forces
would be forced to deal with their activities, just as they did in
Iraq.151
Having a stated mission objective of protecting the civilian
population while not explicitly recognizing the broader U.S. foreign
policy objectives of removing Assad from power, disrupting Al
Qaeda associated forces, and countering Iranian and Iranian surrogate
activities would make the development and implementation of rules
of engagement for such a mission difficult. The operational
requirements and use of force necessary to accomplish these various
objectives differ. Commanders must have a clear understanding of
the assigned national policy objectives to ensure that the appropriate
rules of engagement are drafted and implemented to guide the use of
force to accomplish the mission and allow for self-defense of those
forces deployed.

148. BLANCHARD & SHARP, supra note 7, at 2.
149. Jonathan Stevenson, Op-Ed., To Oust Assad, Pressure Hezbollah, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 2013, at A25; Mark Landler, On Iran and Syria, Tests of
Diplomacy Intertwine, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2013, at A12.
150. CASEY L. ADDIS & CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R41446, HEZBOLLAH: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 n.2
(2011); Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials On Iran, the
IRGC, and Hezbollah's Increased Terrorist Activity Worldwide, U.S. Dep’t of State
(May 31, 2013) available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/210145.htm.
151. See Michael R. Gordon & Ben Hubbard, Qaeda-Linked Group Is Seen
Complicating the Drive for Peace in Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2013, at A10
(explaining Iran’s involvement in sending arms and personnel to assist Assad).
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Who is the enemy? Identifying and declaring forces as hostile—
challenges in the use of force offensively in civil conflicts.

One of the primary challenges in drafting rules of engagement
for interventions in civil conflicts is identifying those forces that are
hostile. Rules of engagement “in the traditional context were
uncontroversial and simple to interpret: soldiers killed soldiers and
protected innocent civilians.”152 This is no longer the case in modern
conflicts, as experienced by the United States in Lebanon, Somalia,
Iraq, and Afghanistan, and would also not be the case in an
intervention in a civil conflict like Syria.153
In conventional state-on-state conflicts, opposing military forces
are lawful military targets and are declared hostile by the rules of
engagement.154 This allows the use of force, as otherwise constrained
by the principles of the law of armed conflict, wherever and
whenever those opposing military forces are found.155 Identifying
those forces in such conflicts had been straightforward as they
distinguished themselves from the civilian population—they wore
uniforms and operated in identifiable formations.156 Properly applied,
the use of force in this manner allows armed forces to eliminate
threats at the time and in the manner that gives them the greatest
advantage—and places them at the least risk. This also allows the
attacking forces to use force at the time and place so as to minimize
civilian casualties. Requiring forces to wait until they are attacked, or
about to be attacked, places them at greater risk, one that is
compounded when there is a lack of intelligence or unfamiliarity with
the groups involved in the conflict and where the enemy carries out
attacks from within the civilian population.157
The difficulty in distinguishing between enemy combatants and
civilians is one that will be faced in almost any intervention
operation. “When those who are fighting . . . melt into the civilian
population and persons who appear to be civilians periodically
engage in hostilities, determining who is a legitimate target becomes
152. Laurie Blank & Amos Guiora, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks:
Operationalizing the Law of Armed Conflict in New Warfare, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC.
J. 45, 58 (2010).
153. Id. at 47 (arguing that in modern conflict a lack of clarity exists regarding
the operational mission and identifying the enemy).
154. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 16.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Blank & Guiora, supra note 152, at 64–66.
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nearly impossible.”158 One of the primary purposes of rules of
engagement is to ensure that the use of force complies with the law of
armed conflict.159 On its face, this would appear to be simple. There
are combatants and civilians. Combatants may be targeted and
civilians must be protected.160
By their very nature, however, civil conflicts are marked by
large numbers of civilians taking up arms and participating in the
hostilities.161 The issue that the rules of engagement must address
then is when those civilians may be targeted. The law of armed
conflict permits the use of force against civilians “for such time as
they take a direct part in hostilities.”162 If the assigned mission calls
for the use of force to accomplish the mission, then commanders
must ensure that the rules of engagement address and identify what
constitutes direct participation.163 While all would agree that
detonating an improvised explosive device would constitute direct
participation, there is no agreement when that direct participation
actually begins.164 Where in the chain of events leading up to the
actual detonation does direct participation begin? Raising money to
buy the components? Buying the components? Constructing the
device? Instructing others on how to construct the device? Storing the
device for later use? Transporting the device to the location where it
will be used? Emplacing the device? What if, instead of emplacing
the device himself, the individual pays a child to emplace the device?

158. Id. at 48.
159. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 76.
160. Id. at 12.
161. Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct
Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 5, 6 (2010).
162. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
art. 51, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
163. Blank & Guiora, supra note 152, at 66–67 (noting that “the expanding
range of persons involved in armed conflict” poses challenges to soldiers seeking to
comply with the law of armed conflict).
164. See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, 31st International Conference of the
Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, Switz., Nov. 28–Dec. 1, 2011, International
Humanitarian Law and The Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, 43–44,
31IC/11/5.1.2 (Oct. 2011) (describing what conduct amounts to direct
participation).
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Is that child now directly participating and therefore a lawful
target?165
Not only is this difficult factually, but there is widespread
disagreement on where to draw the legal lines on what is direct
participation. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
convened a group of experts over the course of five years in an
attempt to provide guidance on what constitutes direct participation
in hostilities.166 This effort ended in a very public disagreement with
several of the experts asking that their names not be listed as
participants in the final report and publishing articles highlighting
their disagreements with the ICRC’s conclusions.167 Other scholars
have called for a change to the current conceptualization of who is a
lawful target, replacing the categories of combatant and civilian with
ones that are more relevant and specific to today’s conflicts.168
The challenge of identifying hostile forces for an intervention in
a situation like Syria would be especially daunting. The opposition
forces fighting against the Syrian regime include groups with fluid
membership and shifting allegiances.169 The Syrian regime is using
not only the Syrian armed forces, but has armed and formed civilians
into paramilitary organizations, and is supported by surrogates such
as Hezbollah and Iranian Qods forces.170 Foreign fighters from the
region as well as from Europe and the United States have traveled to
Syria to join in the fight.171 Groups fighting on both sides have long

165. See DEXTER FILKINS, THE FOREVER WAR 157 (2008) (providing an
example of participation).
166. Nils Melzer, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law
(Feb. 2009) available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002
0990.pdf.
167. Schmitt, supra note 161, at 6.
168. Blank & Guiora, supra note 152, at 46; Rosa Brooks, War Everywhere:
Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror,
153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 757 (2004).
169. See Ken Sofer & Juliana Shafroth, The Structure and Organization of the
Syrian Opposition, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (May 14, 2013), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/05/StructureAndOrganizationSyrianOpposition-copy.pdf
(describing Syrian opposition forces).
170. Julian Borger, Iran and Hezbollah ‘Have Built 50,000-Strong Force to
Help Syrian Regime,’ GUARDIAN, Mar. 14, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/mar/14/iran-hezbollah-force-syrian-regime.
171. Birnbaum, supra note 146; Spillius, supra note 146.
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histories of using terrorism to target U.S. interests, making it likely
that U.S. forces would come under attack from multiple groups.172
The rules of engagement for an operation that included an
objective of disrupting and/or defeating al-Qaeda-associated forces
would have to address which individuals would be declared hostile,
including whether this would be based on membership in the
organization alone, making a functional analysis of that individual’s
participation necessary.173 This, of course, would require knowledge
of the organization and sufficient intelligence to distinguish whether
that individual is a member of the organization or a civilian, i.e., is
the person delivering the electronic components an ISIS logistician or
merely the UPS deliveryman.174 Limitations, based on the policy
objectives and operational requirements, would then be placed on
how and when that force may be used. Would airstrikes and
unobserved indirect fire be permitted? What standards would be used
to ensure that civilians aren’t present or, if so, how civilian casualties
would be minimized? Who would have the authority to approve
strikes on targets where civilians might be present? Would the rules
of engagement allow the use of force against otherwise protected
targets, such as hospitals, mosques, and schools that are being used
for military purposes? If so, who would have authority to approve
such strikes? There would be perhaps no other operational
environment more challenging for U.S. forces to intervene.
C. Self-defense and protecting the civilian population: challenges
in balancing the use of force and identifying threats
Unlike the mission accomplishment rules of engagement
discussed above which authorize the use of force against declared
hostile forces at any time and any place, self-defense rules of
engagement authorize and guide the use of force in response to
hostile acts or demonstrated hostile intent.175 Commanders have the
obligation, and authority, to use all necessary means available and to
take all appropriate action in self-defense of the commander’s unit as
172. See ADDIS & BLANCHARD, supra note 150, at 1 (citing Hezbollah’s
history as an example).
173. See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 21–22 (“[U.S.
military protocol] relies on a case-by-case approach to organized armed groups and
individuals”).
174. Id. at 21–22.
175. See id. at 77 (“[M]ilitary members may exercise individual self-defense in
response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.”).
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well as other U.S. forces in the vicinity.176 Individual military
members also have the inherent right to use force in response to a
hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent, although this may be
limited when operating as part of a unit.177
The use of force in an intervention into a civil conflict will most
likely arise from situations involving self-defense. In operations
where the use of force is limited to self-defense forces need not wait
until they are actually attacked before using force but may not attack
individuals or groups that merely present a potential threat.178
Identifying threats to the force in an environment where hostile forces
do not distinguish themselves from, and may even be part of, the
civilian population that the military forces are tasked with protecting
creates a “tension between respect for IHL and protecting the unit”
and is “the fundamental challenge in new warfare.”179
Rules of engagement that are permissive in nature, liberally
allowing the use of force in self-defense, have the potential for
causing unintended harm to those civilians who find themselves in
the area of the hostile act or hostile intent.180 While the use of force in
self-defense must be proportionate, the range of response permitted
under the law of armed conflict is quite wide, with many military
leaders favoring the use of overwhelming force when confronted with
a hostile act or hostile intent.181 This approach reflects an emphasis
on a military-utilitarian perspective of the use of force over a
humanitarian perspective and places a greater value on protecting the
lives of military forces over those of others in the area of operations.
This is particularly problematic during an intervention into a civil
conflict where protection of the civilian population and avoidance of
civilian casualties is vital to mission success.
This concept of responding with overwhelming force to hostile
acts is exemplified by an account of the response by U.S. forces to a

176. Id. at 90.
177. Id.
178. Id.at 77.
179. Blank & Guiora, supra note 152, at 58–59.
180. WALZER, supra note 136, at 129–30.
181. DAVID G. BOLGIANO & JAMES M. PATTERSON, FIGHTING TODAY’S WARS:
HOW AMERICA’S LEADERS HAVE FAILED OUR WARRIORS 113 (2012) (quoting
Major General Gary L. Harrell (Ret.)) (“[T]he only tactical solution when
confronted with an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury is to
immediately respond with overwhelming force and continue to apply that force
until the threat is over.”).
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mortar attack in Iraq in 2003.182 After a single mortar round was fired
into his compound, Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Sassaman responded
with twenty-eight artillery shells, forty-two mortar rounds, and two
airstrikes—one with a 500 pound bomb and another with a 2,000
pound bomb, later stating “[w]e just didn’t get hit after that.”183 His
“we just didn’t get hit after that” response is just one further example
of the belief that overwhelming force was the answer to all problems.
While the use of overwhelming force in response to a hostile act
or hostile intent may protect the lives of deployed forces in the short
term, the attendant civilian deaths and injuries create second and third
order effects that are likely to place both the national policy
objectives and lives of the military forces in jeopardy in the long
term. Instead of gaining the trust and support of the civilian
population, the intervening force that uses overwhelming force runs
the risk of alienating them, resulting in responses that may be limited
to a decrease in cooperation, such as information sharing, to outright
hostility, creating additional enemy forces that may later carry out
attacks against the intervening military forces.184
Conversely, rules of engagement that are restrictive in nature,
calling for restraint on the part of forces even when they are faced
with a hostile act or hostile intent, not only run the risk of
inadequately protecting the force, but also of eroding public domestic
support.185 The experiences in both Lebanon and Somalia highlight
the potential for strategic risk when rules of engagement are, or are
perceived to be, overly restrictive.186 The scenes of dead American
soldiers playing across the TV screens of people at home, coupled
182. FILKINS, supra note 165, at 163.
183. Id.
184. See Luke N. Condra et al., The Effect of Civilian Casualties in
Afghanistan and Iraq 33 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
16152, 2010) (finding “strong evidence of a revenge effect” in Afghanistan).
185. MATTHEW WAXMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE POLITICS OF URBAN
AIR OPERATIONS MR-1175-AF, 25–26 (2000); see also Rowan Scarborough,
Increase in Battlefield Deaths Linked to Rules of Engagement, WASH. TIMES, Dec.
5, 2013, at A1 (discussing challenges to the rules of engagement by current and
former Marine personnel).
186. See Barry M. Blechman & Tamara Cofman Wittes, Defining Moment:
The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy, 114 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 5
(1999) (quoting Mohamed Farah Aideed, former leader of a Somali faction) (“We
have studied Vietnam and Lebanon and know how to get rid of Americans, by
killing them so that public opinion will put an end to things.”).
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with accusations that political and military leaders restricted troops’
ability to protect themselves, would likely undermine domestic
political support for an operation. Overly restrictive rules of
engagement, coupled with a fear of investigation and prosecution for
alleged U.S. uses of excessive force, may cause forces to hesitate in
using force in response to a hostile act or hostile intent.
The approach taken in the case of Somalia and the UNITAF
ROE, where technical vehicles and crew served weapons were
declared “threats,” was an attempt to satisfy the operational
requirements of removing these weapons from the streets so they no
longer presented a threat to the humanitarian relief efforts while
limiting the use of force to cases of self-defense.187 This, in essence,
created a hybrid self-defense rules of engagement, wherein those
weapons and personnel manning them were treated as potentially
hostile without authorizing the use of force against them absent their
noncompliance with attempts to confiscate their weapons.
This type of rules of engagement had not been used before and
created some confusion over what was meant by “threat.”188 The
clarification provided was that such weapons could not be
immediately attacked but that individuals manning them could be
challenged and “all necessary force” used to disarm them.189 With
this clarification, the rules of engagement were seen as adequate in
allowing sufficient use of force for self-defense and effective in
dealing with the threats posed by armed individuals and crew served
weapons.190 There was little violence against U.S. forces, most of the
technical vehicles and crew served weapons disappeared from the
streets of Mogadishu, and weapons confiscations met with little
opposition.191
As the security situation in Somalia changed, so did the rules of
engagement. Shortly after UNOSOM II took over the military
mission from UNITAF, the security situation deteriorated and
UNOSOM forces increasingly came under attack.192 The UNOSOM
commander responded to this changing security environment by
authorizing the use of force, including air strikes in limited
187. F. M. Lorenz, Law and Anarchy in Somalia, U.S. ARMY WAR C. Q.:
PARAMETERS, Winter 1993–94, at 27, 28.
188. Lorenz, supra note 39, at 63–64.
189. Id. at 64.
190. Id. at 65.
191. Id. at 64–65.
192. Id. at 66–67
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circumstances, against technical vehicles, crew served weapons, and
armed militias without provocation.193 Although the rules of
engagement still referred to them as threats, these objects were
essentially declared hostile, thereby expanding the rules of
engagement beyond mere self-defense.194 After the alleged shooting
of a pregnant Somali woman by a U.S. sniper, this rules of
engagement change was reinterpreted, limiting the targeting of these
objects by U.S. snipers.195 This change was quickly noticed by the
armed militias, resulting in more technical vehicles and crew served
weapons on the streets of Mogadishu and an increased threat to U.S.
and UN forces.196 This incident shows that not only must
commanders remain cognizant of the need to revise the rules of
engagement to reflect evolving threats but also that changes in the
rules of engagement may, in turn, affect the security environment.
Recent U.S. experiences in Afghanistan in dealing with the
strategic consequences of civilian deaths highlight the difficulty in
striking the balance between preventing civilian casualties and
protecting U.S. troops.197 President Karzai’s and the international
community’s criticism of civilian casualties caused by airstrikes on
Afghan compounds led to General McChrystal issuing a tactical
directive that limited the circumstances under which airstrikes against
houses and compounds would be authorized.198 Under standard selfdefense rules of engagement, forces who were attacked from a
compound could call in airstrikes in order to defend themselves from
such an attack.199
Despite this change being widely criticized by many in the
United States, including some members of the U.S. military, as being
too restrictive and a move that would lead to increased U.S.
casualties, civilian casualties did drop after its implementation.200
193. Id. at 66.
194. Id. at 68.
195. Id. at 69–70.
196. Id. at 70.
197. See Condra et al., supra note 184, at 32.
198. Tactical Directive, International Security Assistance Force (July 6, 2009)
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/Tactical_Directive_090706.pdf.
199. See id. (“This directive does not prevent commanders from protecting the
lives of their men and women as a matter of self-defense . . . .”).
200. Walter Dorn, The Just War Index: Comparing Warfighting and
Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 10 J. MIL. ETHICS 242, 253–54 (2011).
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This tactical directive was replaced by General Petraeus when he
assumed command and again by General Allen in 2011.201 These
latter directives were not as restrictive as the initial tactical directive
but still stressed the need to balance the use of force with the need to
protect Afghan civilians. In his directive, General Allen stated
“[c]onsider all use of force carefully . . . [e]nsure that the use of force
is necessary and proportionate to the threat faced, and when applied it
is precisely delivered.”202 He further stated that “my direction in no
way compromises the inherent right of every individual and unit to
employ appropriate measures in self-defense.”203
D. Defense of others: who will be protected and when?
Another matter that should be addressed by the rules of
engagement is whether force may be used in defense of other forces
and personnel. In traditional armed conflicts, the use of force may
also be authorized in defense of partner nation forces.204 The rules of
engagement may also authorize the use of force to defend civilians
who are threatened with death or serious injury and should be
addressed in any intervention that has an objective of protecting the
civilian population.205 Allowing the use of force to protect civilians
does carry risks. In an internal, civil conflict, where no group is seen
as uninvolved or innocent, such use of force could also lead to a
perceived loss of impartiality and further embroil intervening forces
in the conflict.206
The U.S. experience in Lebanon in 1983 is just such an example.
The use of force in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces against
Druze and Shia militia groups led to a perceived loss of neutrality in
the internal Lebanese conflict and likely created additional threats to
U.S. forces.207 The use of large caliber, indirect, naval fire also
resulted in additional civilian casualties, creating further enemies
among those groups who might otherwise not present a threat to U.S.
forces.208 Instead of acting as a buffer, separating the various factions
201. COMISAF’s Tactical Directive, International Security Assistance Force
(Nov. 30, 2011) http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/docs/20111105%20nuc%20
tactical%20directive%20revision%204%20(releaseable%20version)%20r.pdf.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 77.
205. Id. at 76.
206. Id. at 66.
207. DOD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 59, at 42.
208. Id. at 39–40.
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to give the Lebanese Armed Forces the time to reassert control, this
use of force brought the United States into the conflict itself, in direct
contravention of the original mission.209
Using force to defend civilians in the Syrian conflict would be
even more complex. Fluid membership and shifting allegiances in
and among the groups would make it extremely difficult to identify
who should be protected and from whom. Would force be authorized
to defend opposition forces from Syrian regime forces and its
surrogates? If so, would this also include ISIS and ANF forces? If the
intervention included an objective to disrupt and destroy ISIS and
ANF forces, would force be authorized to protect Syrian regime
forces being attacked by these groups? Even if the rules of
engagement were clear on their face on who may be protected and
when, applying this in the field would be challenging, making
mistakes very likely. Additionally, the involvement of Iran and other
states raises the risk of a mistake in the use of force escalating the
conflict requiring geographical limitations on the use of force. For
example, scenarios such as whether force could be used to defend
against attacks from ISIS controlled areas in western Iraq or from
Hezbollah controlled areas in Lebanon would need to be addressed in
the rules of engagement.
E.

Reviewing and changing rules of engagement to reflect the
changing threat and security environment

Just as rules of engagement must be reviewed and changed when
mission objectives change, commanders must also review and change
rules of engagement as the operational environment and nature of the
threat changes. This requires both an awareness of the operational
area and adequate intelligence assets that are capable of detecting
these changes. Commanders also have to develop a process that
accepts input from those leading operations in the field, as they will
often be the first to detect changing threats.210
Again, the U.S. experiences in Lebanon and Somalia show the
importance of being aware of changing security conditions and
revising the rules of engagement in response to those changes. While
the rules of engagement for U.S. forces in Lebanon were changed to
allow the use of naval gunfire and other indirect fire weapons to
209. Id. at 44.
210. See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 83 (defining and
explaining Escalation of Force).
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support the Lebanese Armed Forces, those changes were not
adequate to address the increased threat to U.S. forces. Despite
coming under increasing attack, including small arms fire on the
barracks and the use of suicide vehicle bombs against other targets,
Marine sentries were still prohibited from keeping their weapons
fully armed to quickly respond to a hostile act.211 Thus, even though
the rules of engagement allowed, in theory, the use of force in
response to a hostile act, those same rules of engagement placed
practical limitations on the force’s ability to do so.
While the intervention in the civil conflict in Somalia began as a
humanitarian operation, the U.S. mission soon expanded to include
the attempted disarming of the clans and the arrest of Aided and other
senior clan leaders. As in the case of Lebanon, this expansion of the
mission turned elements of the population against U.S. and UN forces
leading to increased attacks against these forces. As this threat
continued to increase, the rules of engagement were restricted, with
snipers no longer allowed to target, without provocation, the
technical vehicles and crew served weapons that presented the
greatest threats. This only further emboldened the armed clans who
quickly understood the changes in rules of engagement and used
them to their advantage.
CONCLUSION
Conflicts where there is clarity on the battlefield, where
combatants and civilians are easily distinguished, may be a thing of
the past.212 U.S. forces will continue to find themselves operating in
highly fluid and complex environments with shifting mission
objectives and unclear threats. How then can those forces adequately
balance the use of force to both accomplish the mission and protect
themselves?
Unfortunately, the answer is not as simple as merely drafting
better rules of engagement. Ensuring that forces intervening in civil
conflicts are organized, trained, and equipped appropriately is the
first step in meeting the challenges posed by these operations. Those
forces should be familiar with the environment into which they are
deploying so that they may better understand what acts will constitute
hostile intent.213 Sufficient intelligence assets will be needed to help
211. DOD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 59, at 45.
212. DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW 112 (2006).
213. See Thom Shanker, Reshaped Military Will Bridge the Gap Between
Special and Conventional Forces, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2012, at A22 (discussing
region-oriented army training).
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commanders and troops understand the complex environment in
which they will be operating. Intelligence assets are also necessary to
alert commanders to changes in the operational environment,
particularly a change in threats against the force. Such an intelligence
capability cannot be built overnight and would need to be in
existence prior to the forces deploying to the area of intervention, as
highlighted by the U.S. experience in Lebanon.214 Most importantly
national leadership must provide clear strategic and policy goals built
on solid domestic political support to military commanders prior to
intervening in a civil conflict.
Additionally, policymakers and commanders must ensure that:
- Policy and military objectives are clearly defined and
understood by all within the chain of command;
- There is a clear understanding of the operational
environment, including the identification of threats to
the force and mission;
- Changes to the operational environment, including
the emergence of new threats, are recognized; and,
- The rules of engagement are reviewed and changed
as the threat and operational environment changes.
While U.S. forces may never be ordered to intervene in the civil
conflict in Syria, they will, at some point in the future, find
themselves in a similar operational environment. When that time
comes, let us hope that those ordering the intervention will give those
forces clear mission objectives and the resources that will allow them
to sufficiently balance the use of force to protect both the civilians at
risk as well as those intervening in the conflict.

214. See DOD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 59, at 63–66 (discussing
intelligence support in Lebanon).

